

deployment were contingent upon the actual fact of disengagement and not their promise. Additionally, State believes that it would be premature to move the squadron before the required follow-on actions are taken to consummate Faysal's agreement as set forth above. This will require further negotiations with Nasser (who has yet to be informed of the proposed movement of the squadron), Sallal, Prime Minister of the Yemen, and the UN in New York. In short, we are in mid-passage with somewhat brighter prospects than heretofore for resolution of the Yemeni affair and the attendant UAR-Saudi involvement therein. However, there is still some hard and perhaps painful negotiating ahead.⁴

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⁴ A handwritten note by Strong dated April 8 reads as follows: "On the air squadron to Saudi Arabia, the Pres., PT says, does not want any early action. He wants disengagement to get going & then put it in. I told PT this is our view, we have 2 weeks before 'ten days prior to May 2', and we could easily split the difference to April 27, meaning 19 days. I am trying to make sure the Pentagon doesn't start cranking all over again right now." (Ibid., NEA/NE Files: Lot 66 D 116, Bunker Mission & UN Effort Other than tels)

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

211. Editorial Note

On April 10, 1963, the Department of State transmitted to the Mission to the United Nations guidance for a forthcoming meeting with Secretary-General U Thant concerning the U.N. role in the Yemen disengagement agreement. U Thant was to be fully briefed on the terms of the UAR-Saudi agreement, negotiated by Bunker, and encouraged not to seek Yemen's formal adherence to the agreement, because Saudi Arabia would object. Rather, Yemen could acquiesce orally to the agreement. The guidance also contained specific suggestions for the size, composition, location, and equipment of the neutral observer mission that would police the Saudi-Yemeni demilitarized zone and verify Saudi Arabia's suspension of aid to the royalists and the withdrawal of UAR forces. The Department also indicated U.S. willingness to provide logistic support for the mission, but indicated a preference that the UAR and Saudi Arabia or perhaps the Arab League fund the mission, or that funding be taken out of the U.N. budget. (Telegram 2563 to USUN, April 10; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 YEMEN/UN)